Payments for environmental services in watersheds : insights from a comparative study of three cases in Central America by Kosoy, Nicolás et al.
 1
 
Payments for Environmental Services in Watersheds: Insights From a 
Comparative Study of three Cases in Central America 
 
Nicolas Kosoy1, Miguel Martinez-Tuna1, Roldan Muradian2 and Joan Martinez-Alier1 
 
1Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals (ICTA). Autonomous University of Barcelona. Building C. 08193. 
Bellaterra. Barcelona. Spain 
2Development Research Institute (IVO). Tilburg University. P.O. Box 90153. 5000 LE. Tilburg. The Netherlands. 
roldan@uvt.nl. Corresponding author. 




We have compared three cases of payments for water-related environmental services 
(PES) in Central America, in terms of socioeconomic background, opportunity costs 
of forest conservation and stakeholders’ perceptions on the conditions of water 
resources and other issues. We found that, in general, the foregone benefits from land 
uses alternative to forest cover are larger than the amount paid, which apparently 
contradicts the economic foundation of PES schemes. A number of possible 
explanations are explored. The results also suggest that trade-offs between different 
environmental and social goals are likely to emerge in PES schemes, posing some 
doubts on their ability to be multipurpose instruments for environmental improvement 
and rural development. We also found that PES schemes may work as a conflict-
resolution instrument, facilitating downstream -upstream problem solving, though at 
the same time they might introduce changes in social perceptions of property rights. 
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Even though the theoretical foundations of payments for environmental services 
(PES) were set several decades ago (Coase, 1960), the practical implementation of 
these market-based instruments for managing natural resources has started rather 
recently. So far, a number of payment schemes at the watershed level have been 
already implemented, mainly in Latin America, allowing for preliminary lessons 
(Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Mayrand and Paquin, 2004; Warner et al., 2004; 
Rosa et al., 2004). These schemes stem from the fact that natural or human-managed 
ecosystems provide positive environmental externalities, normally not taken into 
account in individual economic decisions (Pagiola et al., 2002a). The term 
“environmental services” refers to the provision of these positive externalities. 
Different types of markets for environmental services have been described in 
watersheds, from voluntary contractual arrangements to marketable permit systems 
(Tognetti et al., 2005). The three cases analyzed in the present paper constitute 
examples of voluntary direct payments from downstream water users to upstream 
providers of water-related environmental  services, through the action of an 
intermediary agency.  
 
By means of market transactions between downstream and upstream economic 
agents, PES schemes are supposed to induce upstream stakeholders to take 
downstream effects into account when making decisions about their own land use. 
This is expected to lead to larger socio-economic efficiency. Moreover, direct 
payments are expected to be more cost-effective in meeting environmental and 
development goals, as compared to indirect means of financing a better stewardship 
of natural resources (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). PES schemes are derived from the 
Coase’s theorem. Namely, in a free market with clearly established property rights 
and no transaction costs, the gains in efficiency due to the internalization of 
environmental externalities are independent from the direction of the payment, and 
also from the initial endowment of property rights. Hence, the adoption of the 
polluter-pay principle is not a condition for achieving a Pareto better situation when 
applying this kind of instruments.  In fact, most water-related service payments do not 
hold to the polluter-pay principle, since upstream landholders are often compensated 
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for avoiding/reducing negative environmental externalities. However, payment 
schemes for environmental services should fulfill the following two conditions in 
order to be efficient: i) the compensation of upstream landholders should be at least 
equal to the opportunity cost of the promoted land use; and ii) the amount of the 
payment should be lower than the economic value of the environmental externality 
(for example, the abatement cost of improving water quality).  
 
Direct payments for environmental services have been proposed as promising tools, 
alternative to command-and-control instruments for forest protection (Nathan and 
Kelkar, 2001), biodiversity conservation (Pagiola et al., 2004) and watershed 
management. Typically, command-and-control institutions and policies may be 
effective in controlling pollution from well-defined point sources, such as factories or 
sewage treatment plants. However, they are less effective in regulating non-point 
sources of pollution, such as those occurring when downstream water pollution (or 
scarcity) is the result of the combination of individual actions carried out by 
geographically disperse and heterogeneous upstream providers (Lubell et al., 2002).  
 
In watersheds, direct use rights on forests often belong to upstream landholders. 
Nonetheless, forests provide a variety of environmental services to diverse 
stakeholders, at different geographical scales, leading to rivalry in the consumption of 
forest goods and services. Thus, as in the case of common property resources (Gibson 
et al., 2000; Ostrom et al., 2002), the resolution of conflicts between different 
beneficiaries of environmental goods and services from forests typically involves 
collectively beneficial but individually costly actions. Economic incentives (for the 
adoption of costly actions) are supposed to be particularly effective in such 
circumstances (Seabright, 1993). Besides, the institutional arrangement of PES 
schemes may contribute to reduce transaction and monitoring costs, which are 
normally assumed to be critical features for solving collective action problems 
(Taylor and Singleton, 1993). 
 
In tropical watersheds, vulnerable groups tend to be located in upstream areas, where 
land is usually less productive and more prone to suffer erosion. Nevertheless, these 
rural communities are often providers of environmental services benefiting other 
groups with a better socioeconomic situation (often located in downstream urban 
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areas). Hence, PES schemes are also expected to contribute to wealth redistribution 
and poverty alleviation (Pagiola et al., 2002b; Pagiola et al., 2005). PES may work as 
multipurpose (win-win) instruments, improving the conditions of different types of 
natural resources at the same time (e.g. forests and water), raising awareness about the 
economic worth of ecosystems, and contributing to economic development (Landell-
Mills, 2002).  
 
The aim of this article is to compare three cases of payments for environmental  
services in watersheds, in order to draw lessons about the design, functioning, and 
local impacts of PES schemes.  The following section describes briefly the 
methodology used. Section 3 summarizes main results. Section 4 discusses the results 
and develops some insights for PES design.  
 
2. Methodology  
The fieldwork was carried out in Jesus de Otoro (Honduras), San Pedro del Norte 
(Nicaragua) and Heredia (Costa Rica) between July and December 2004. These case 
studies were compared in terms of perception of different stakeholders, institutional 
context, opportunity costs in upstream land use, and local economic implications of 
the payment schemes.  Stakeholders were classified into four main categories: users, 
providers, potential providers and intermediaries. Users are the beneficiaries of the 
environmental services rendered by providers. In our case studies, users are 
downstream water consumers in urban areas, who pay an additional fee to the PES 
scheme. Providers are upstream agents participating in the PES scheme by means of a 
contractual relation (with the intermediary) regulating land use. Potential providers 
are those upstream landholders that are not currently part of the scheme, but may 
become part of it in the future. Intermediaries are the agents mediating transfer of 
resources between users and providers. In our cases, the intermediaries are grassroots 
non-profit organizations (Jesus de Otoro and San Pedro del Norte) and a local public 
enterprise (Heredia). 
 
We used a combination of quantitative and qualitative research techniques. Structured 
questionnaires were administered to users, semi-structured questionnaires to providers 
and potential providers, and in-depth interviews were conducted with key informants 
and representatives from intermediary organizations. We also collected secondary 
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information on the legal, institutional and socioeconomic context. The questionnaires 
differed depending on the target group. All included three main sections: background 
information, economic aspects and perceptions on the PES scheme, the condition of 
water resources and other water-related issues.  Altogether, we conducted 18 
interviews and 117 questionnaires in Honduras, 7 interviews and 111 questionnaires 
in Costa Rica, and 9 interviews and 65 questionnaires in Nicaragua.  
  
The opportunity costs of maintaining forest cover were estimated by means of 
calculating three proxy variables: a) net profits from on-farm activities that would be 
foregone; b) providers’ willingness to accept as a “fair price” for PES; and c) the 
expected rent that would be obtained if the land were rented out. In theory, these three 
variables should converge, particularly if farmers depend on their land for ensuring 
their livelihoods. For the present article, net on-farm profit is defined as total 
production multiplied by the average price of products, minus the cost of inputs 
(agrochemicals, water, energy, etc.) and the cost of labor, including imputed (own) 
labor.  The “degree of compensation” is calculated deducting the values obtained by 
means of the above-mentioned proxy variables from the potential or actual amount 
paid by the PES scheme. A negative value for the “degree of compensation” means 
that the PES scheme does not (or would not) compensate the opportunity cost.  
 
In San Pedro del Norte, we assume that the three proxy variables described above 
applied to providers reveal information that may be used for estimating opportunity 
costs of forest conservation. Equally, we assume that “on-farm profits” and the 
“willingness to rent” of potential providers are also proxies for the opportunity costs 
of forest conservation. The PES scheme in Jesus de Otoro compensates upstream 
landholders not only for conserving the forest (as the other two schemes do), but also 
for adopting better environmental practices. Therefore, in this case, there are two 
types of opportunity costs: one related to forest conservation, and another one arising 
from the adoption of better environmental practices. The providers get compensated 
for adopting better environmental practices. In order to estimate the opportunity cost 
of maintaining forest cover, “on-farm profits” and the “willingness to rent” of 
potential providers are used as proxies. We assume that only perceptions of a “fair 
price” of the PES by providers might shed some information about the opportunity 
cost of adopting better environmental practices. The most appropriate way to estimate 
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the opportunity cost of adopting better environmental practices would be to calculate 
the foregone benefits in agriculture and cattle raising when adopting such practices. 
However, our methodology did not allow for a comparison of the economic 
performance of landholders before and after the adoption of such practices. 
 
In Heredia, urbanization is the most likely alternative land use to forest cover, and the 
livelihood of providers does not depend on agriculture or cattle raising. Accordingly, 
we consider that “on-farm profits” is not a good proxy for the opportunity cost of 
forest conservation. Therefore, we assume that only “willingness to rent” and “fair 
price” shed meaningful information about opportunity costs in this case. Potential 
providers in Heredia were not willing to take part in the research, clearly being 
opposed to the PES scheme. For that reason, they are not included in the results.     
 
3. Results 
3.1 Overall description of the case studies 
Jesus de Otoro, Honduras 
Jesus de Otoro is located in the Department of Itibucá, in the Center-West of 
Honduras. It has about 5,200 inhabitants. The water consumed in this town comes 
from the watershed of the Cumes River. The area of the watershed is 3,180 ha, of 
which 70 % is covered by forest. Part of the watershed is within the Natural Reserve 
Montecillos (protected area). Its highest elevation of this watershed is of 2,200 m.a.s.l. 
Coffee plantations are very common in the upstream area and the main economic 
activity in the region is agriculture. The local Council for Administration of Water 
and Sewage Disposal (JAPOE), a grassroots organization, is in charge of managing 
water provision and sanitation in town. The creation of JAPOE was a response to 
serious water problems at the beginning of 1990s. This organization took over the 
management of water and sanitation services from the Municipality. The authorities 
of JAPOE are elected in general assemblies in 10 different sectors of the town, thus it 
constitutes a decentralized and participatory institution for water and sanitation 
management. In 1996, an expansion of upstream cultivated areas, mainly coffee, 
increased the pollution levels in the surface waters, also used for drinking water. This 
led to severe conflicts between downstream water consumers and upstream 
landholders. In 2001, the Program for Sustainable Agriculture in Hillsides of Central 
America (PASOLAC), financed by the Swiss international cooperation, supported 
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technically JAPOE to create a payment scheme for environmental services, and 
provided the seed capital. At the time the fieldwork was conducted, the scheme 
offered payments to only 4 providers and covered about 22 ha. Later, the coverage has 
been expanded to 18 providers and 74 ha. We could interview 3 out of the 4 
providers. The scheme is meant to promote both the adoption of better environmental 
practices and the conservation of forests, and it is expected to cover up to 200 ha in 
the future. The amount of the payment depends on the number of “better practices” 
adopted and on the type of forest protected. The payment amounts are summarized in 
Table 1.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The land uses promoted are: 
? No burning before, during or after planting   
? Construction of vegetal fences, irrigation ditches and terraces.  
? Establishment of agroforestry systems 
? Production of organic fertilizers  
? Recycling of coffee pulp and management of wastes from coffee processing 
? Implementation of organic agriculture 
? Forest protection and reforestation 
 
JAPOE charges water fees to 1,269 households. Water users pay an additional fee in 
their water bill for the PES scheme, which in 2004 was 0.06 US$ (1 Lempira) per 
household per month. The scheme aims primarily to improve water quality. Water 
availability is not a significant problem in the region.  
 
The creation of the scheme was supported by three technical studies, including an 
economic valuation. Regardless of the quality of these studies and the reliability of 
their results, the use of the technical assessments in the design of the scheme was not 
clear-cut. For example, the actual PES fee was only 3.6 % of the water users´ 
estimated willingness to pay.  The final amount of the fee was decided through voting 
of representatives from the different water sectors in town. The overall cost of design 
and initial setup of the scheme was about 30,000 US$.  
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Heredia, Costa Rica 
Heredia is part of the large urban conglomeration of the Central Valley of Costa Rica. 
Water for this city comes from the Virilla River watershed. The area of the watershed 
providing water to Heredia is approximately 11,340 ha, and its highest elevation is of 
2250 m.a.s.l.  This PES scheme was designed and managed by ESPH S.A, a public 
local enterprise for water provision and sanitation. Users are 48,667 households. Part 
of the National Park “Braulio Carrillo” is located in this watershed. About 34% of the 
Virilla watershed is covered by forest. In 2002, the PES scheme was created in order 
to avoid deterioration of the upstream area of the watershed, where water sources are 
located. The scheme prioritized 1,062 ha in the upstream area, from which 415 ha are 
currently part of it. The main goal of the scheme is to prevent deterioration of water 
quality, since the city currently does not seem to face water scarcity. At the time the 
fieldwork was conducted, there were 10 providers, and all were interviewed. The 
scheme has identified 29 landholders as potential providers. However, none of them 
were willing to participate in this study.  
 
The area where the PES is implemented has also become a high-status residence (or 
leisure) place for well paid professionals, who normally work in downstream urban 
areas, or for foreigners. All the providers interviewed, except one, held a university 
degree. Users paid 0.008 US$/m3 to the PES scheme, which was about 6% of the 
normal water fee for households. ESPH has also established an agreement with a 
beverage company consuming local water resources (Florida Ice & Farm Co) for 
allocating additional resources to the PES scheme. Table 1 summarizes the amounts 
paid to providers for forest conservation and reforestation. The scheme promotes the 
following land uses and practices:  
 
• Prevention and control of forest fires 
• No hunting or illegal extraction of forest products 
• No extraction of wood products 
• Forest conservation: no forest conversion to agriculture or cattle ranching 
• Reforestation (optional) 
 
In 2003, the scheme also invested a considerable part of the fund for land acquisition 
in the upstream area. As in Jesus de Otoro, the relationship between the outputs of the 
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technical studies supporting the initial design of the scheme and its final functioning 
and structure was not straightforward. For example, the fee charged to users was 
decided on political grounds, and it is considerable lower than their estimated 
willingness to pay. The cost of the initial setup of the scheme was about 32,000 US$. 
 
San Pedro del Norte, Nicaragua 
The “Paso de Los Caballos” watershed is located in the western region of Nicaragua. 
It has a tropical climate characterized by a strong dry season, and its area is about 741 
ha, 21 % of which is covered by forests. The main economic activities in the region 
are agriculture and cattle ranching. This watershed supplies water to 125 households 
in San Pedro del Norte. Dwellers of this locality face considerable water problems, 
both in terms of quality and availability. Locally, these problems are often attributed 
to the highly degraded forests. This PES scheme shares many features with that in 
Jesus de Otoro. The Water Committee currently in charge of the PES was created to 
take over water provision and sanitation, as a local response to the inefficient service 
previously provided by a public enterprise. As in Jesus de Otoro, PASOLAC 
introduced the idea of the PES scheme, and provided a seed fund for background 
technical studies and setting up the system in 2003. Previous to the establishment of 
the PES, PASOLAC sponsored the visit of a delegation from the local Water 
Committee and the Municipality to learn from the Jesus de Otoro experience. At the 
time the fieldwork was conducted, 5 upstream landowners and 39 ha were part of the 
PES scheme.  
 
125 households contribute with US $ 0.31/month to the PES scheme. As in Jesus de 
Otoro, the fee was decided in a participatory way in the Water Committee, and it 
differs considerably from the estimations of willingness to pay made by the technical 
reports. Each provider receives approximately US $26/ha/year. This amount was set 
by negotiations between the Water Committee and each of the providers. The cost of 
the initial setup was about US$10,000, some of which go to current payments. The 
scheme promotes the following land uses: 
 
• Conserve and manage the forested area 
• Prevention and control of forest fires 
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• Restricted timber extraction 
• Implementation of a management plan  
• Livestock raising is not allowed  
• Subsistence crop farming is allowed only in one hectare per provider, without 
the use of pesticides and agro-chemicals 
 
3.2 Quantitative analysis 
3.2.1 Providers and potential providers 
The socioeconomic characteristics of the three places differ noticeably. Providers and 
potential providers in Jesus de Otoro and San Pedro del Norte are relatively poor 
peasants who rely to a large extent on their land for their livelihoods.  Their 
subsistence farming systems are characterized by low or even negative, on-farm 
profits.  In Heredia, providers are wealthy professionals whose income does not 
depend on their land (see Tables 2 and 3). Miranda et al. (2003) also found that the 
main beneficiaries of PES schemes in the Virilla watershed are wealthy landholders, 
as in other cases in Costa Rica (Zbinden and Lee, 2005).  
 
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The amount received from the PES scheme constitutes less than 2% of gross annual 
income for most providers, in the three cases (see Table 2).  Most providers do not 
think that the amount they receive as payment for environmental services is “fair”. 
Both providers and potential providers in San Pedro del Norte should state similar 
values for “net on-farm profits”, “fair PES” and “willingness to rent”, since the 
expected rent from land should be at least the actual benefits from farming activities.  
Equally, providers in Heredia should report similar “fair PES” and “willingness to 
rent”. Nonetheless, the above-mentioned values differ noticeably. This means that the 
estimation of the opportunity costs differ considerably, depending on the method 
used, and the assumptions adopted. 
 
In Jesus de Otoro, we assume that providers’ perception on “fair PES” should reflect 
the opportunity costs of adopting better environmental practices, since these providers 
are actually paid for adopting such practices. We have also calculated the opportunity 
cost of forest conservation in Jesus de Otoro among potential providers. Table 4 
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shows averages of actual or potential “degree of compensation” by the PES schemes, 
according to different methods for estimating opportunity costs in the three case 
studies. In general, we found that opportunity costs were larger than the actual or 
potential payment, regardless of the method used.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.2.2 Users 
 Notwithstanding differences in their socioeconomic background (see Table 5), users 
in the three cases share a number of common features. The results of the information 
gathered from users may be summarized as follows:  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
• The impact of the PES scheme on the income of users is low 
• Most of them consume water directly from the tap, which means that they 
are vulnerable to water quality problems  
• The majority of users share the belief that a larger forest cover will lead to 
both better water quality and greater water availability  
• Most users perceive that water provision is the most important benefit 
from forests  
• Most users are not aware of the existence of the PES scheme. When the 
scheme is explained, the majority of users in Heredia and Jesus de Otoro 
agree with the amount of the payment. However, only 29 % of the 
surveyed users in San Pedro del Norte agree with such amount.  
• A large majority of users in Jesus de Otoro and Heredia think that the 
water service provided by the intermediary is good and reliable around the 
year, while most users in San Pedro del Norte consider that the overall 
quality of the service is bad 
• The majority of users in both Jesus de Otoro and San Pedro del Norte 
perceive that water quality and availability have improved during the last 
two years, while in Heredia most users consider that the quality of the 
service has not changed during the last two years (it has remained good). 
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4. Discussion and insights for PES design 
 
We have found that, in general, the degree of compensation for forest 
conservation is negative, irrespectively from the estimation method. Unfortunately 
we were unable to estimate the opportunity costs for the adoption of better 
environmental practices in Jesus de Otoro, which would probably shed interesting 
insights on this issue. We expect that it is easier to fully compensate for the 
opportunity cost of adopting better practices than for protecting the forest or 
reforesting. Our empirical findings suggesting that the amount of the payment is 
below the opportunity cost of forest conservation apparently challenge the 
economic foundation of PES schemes, since upstream landholders should demand 
as compensation at least the value of the foregone economic benefits. There are a 
number of possible interpretations for this outcome. Firstly, if one adopts the 
proposition that providers are rational economic actors, it is possible to assume 
that as far as providers participate voluntarily in the scheme their opportunity 
costs are indeed being compensated; otherwise they would simply decline to do 
so.  If this is the case, negative “degrees of compensation” are a methodological 
artifact, which might be generated by variety of causes. For example, it is possible 
that the opportunity cost of forest protection is overestimated by “on-farm 
profits”. This is likely if the current area covered by forest is not very suitable for 
agricultural production or cattle raising (for example, because it is located in steep 
slopes, or in poor soils), and therefore has a low value for landholders. Another 
factor that may explain this result is that landholders obtain economic benefits 
from forests’ environmental goods and services, such as provision of firewood, 
non-timber products, shade or scenery. These direct or indirect economic benefits 
provided by forest to upstream landholders were not estimated in this study. 
However, providers mentioned as main forests benefits, goods and services that 
are related to farm production, such as firewood, soil protection and climate 
regulation (see Table 2), while water provision was the main forest benefit 
identified by downstream users (see Table 5). A third explanation may be that 
farmers have systematically overstated their profits, willingness to rent their land 
and perceptions of a “fair” price for PES, as bargain strategies for higher 
payments. Furthermore, in-kind payments, such as technical training, may also 
play an important role in motivating providers to adopt the PES scheme, even 
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though opportunity costs are not fully compensated. In fact, all providers in Jesus 
de Otoro stated that this kind of supporting activities constituted significant 
benefits from the PES scheme.  
 
Nonetheless, if providers are assumed to be agents with “bounded rationality”, 
other types of explanations may be also explored. For example, an alternative 
interpretation might be that providers consider the payment as a small incentive, 
not significant in terms of the household economy. They perceive the payment as 
a “support” (some providers used explicitly the word “apoyo”), namely a token 
incentive to implement activities already socially desirable. On the one hand, local 
social and cultural features, such as religious or social habits, environmental 
awareness and education programs, may play a role in inducing forest 
conservation, even though it may be economically inefficient from the individual 
point of view. On the other hand, providers are somehow pressed by other groups 
of society to adopt practices benefiting the commons. Property rights might in 
theory be clearly defined but in fact, environmental conflicts are about who enjoys 
and who pays for the environment. For instance, the latent threat to incorporate 
upstream lands into protected areas seems to have played a role in convincing 
providers in Jesus de Otoro and Heredia to be part of the scheme. There lands are 
near protected areas that were established in part for ensuring the protection of 
headwaters. The extent to which the above-mentioned and other kind of 
“intangibles” may influence upstream land husbandry is an interesting area for 
research (Bergsma, 2000). Due to our methodological constraints, we think that 
our results suggesting that the PES schemes do not compensate totally the 
opportunity costs of forest conservation are not yet conclusive, but have a 
heuristic value. They may shed new light for developing working hypotheses that 
might be tested in future research. The calculation of opportunity costs among 
landholders in developing countries is a daunting task, since it depends on a large 
number of assumptions, landholders usually do not register their transactions, and 
strategic answers are unavoidable.  
 
In Heredia, it is likely that providers will keep the remaining forest cover on their 
land, independently of the implementation of the PES scheme. This does not hold 
however for the potential providers, who are strongly reluctant to participate in the 
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PES scheme. Paradoxically, it is probable that landholders already committed to 
forest conservation are the ones who participate as providers in the PES, while 
those upstream landholders prone to deforestation and urbanization will possibly 
permanently decline to be part of it. The cost-effectiveness of the payments would 
be doubtful if this is the case. The evaluation of PES vis-à-vis alternative tools for 
downstream-upstream concerted action is a critical point to take into account in 
the initial design of PES schemes. If future providers are already strongly 
committed to keep the promoted land uses, then direct payments are probably not 
the most suitable mechanism for achieving the expected environmental goals.  
 
The fact that the payment has a small impact on the income of both providers and 
users has a number of implications. First, since the additional cost is low, users are 
keen to pay it and to agree with the scheme, as in Heredia and Jesus de Otoro. The 
lower acceptance among users in San Pedro may be explained in part by a bad 
reputation of the local water service, a larger share of the PES fee to users’ 
average income (see Table 4) and the recent implementation of the scheme. 
Secondly, since the additional fee is very low, it does not constitute an economic 
incentive for reducing water demand. This may impose some limitations on the 
PES as an instrument to increase water availability. Thirdly, a small impact on the 
income of providers makes the PES scheme both more vulnerable to external 
factors and probably an ineffective tool for poverty alleviation or wealth 
redistribution in cases such as San Pedro del Norte and Jesus de Otoro.  This is a 
critical issue since these instruments, although not having poverty reduction as 
their primary concern, are expected to contribute also to economic development 
and poverty alleviation (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005).  
 
The analyzed schemes are based on the local perception that water provision is 
one of the main forest benefits, and the popular belief that larger upstream forest 
cover leads to better downstream water quality and greater quantity (see Table 5). 
This perception seems to be common among rural dwellers in Latin America 
(Johnson and Baltodano, 2004) and other tropical regions of the world (Wilk, 
2000). Nevertheless, the disparity between public and scientific perceptions on the 
hydrological functions of forests is well documented (Tognetti, et al. 2004). The 
gap between conventional wisdom and scientific evidence is summarized in Table 
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6. The relationship between land uses and hydrological dynamics is probably the 
most critical technical challenge of water-related PES schemes.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
The expansion of forest cover may have a net positive impact on downstream 
water availability if the competing land use (e.g. agriculture) is intensive in water 
consumption. However, in most cases the empirical evidence shows that enlarging 
forest cover leads to lower water availability downstream. For that reason, even 
though there is little knowledge about the effects of tropical forest cover on 
groundwater flow (Grip et al. 2005), PES schemes aiming to rise water 
availability by means of expanding forest cover should be avoided, at least as a 
precautionary strategy. The assumptions about the relationship between land use 
and water-related environmental services are decisive for evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of these instruments, and for establishing the direction of the 
payment. Indeed, a scheme in South Africa applies an opposite logic to those here 
described since it levies a charge on commercial afforestation areas, in order to 
compensate for the capture of water by some types of trees (Katilla and 
Puurstjärvi, 2004).  
 
Regarding the relationship between forest cover and water quality, there is a 
smaller mismatch between public and science perceptions. The empirical 
scientific evidence on that subject may be summarized as follows (Ayward, 2005): 
 
• Erosion increases with forest disturbance 
• Deforestation likely results in larger sedimentation rates  
• Forest-pasture conversion generally increases nutrient and chemical 
outflows, as leaching rises 
 
These conclusions coincide very much with the public perception that forest cover 
and water quality are positively correlated (see Table 5). PES schemes are more 
likely to be effective when they tackle water quality problems. There is less 
uncertainty and less divergence between public expectations and scientific 
evidence on the relationship between land use and water quality.  
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Probably the emphasis on the adoption of better environmental practices among 
upstream farmers makes the PES scheme in Jesus de Otoro comparatively more 
cost-effective in achieving its main environmental goal; namely, to improve water 
quality. By creating incentives for forest protection, and therefore averting 
agricultural production (or other land uses), the schemes in Heredia and San Pedro 
may also have an impact on water quality, but possibly at the expense of reducing 
downstream water availability. More research is needed to test the assumptions on 
the relationships between land use and the provision of environmental services on 
which PES schemes rely upon (Kaimowitz, 2005).  This will be a hard task owing 
to the intrinsic complexity, context-specificity, and scale-dependent nature of the 
hydrological functions of different land uses (Gautam et al., 2004; Mungai et al., 
2004; van Noordwijk et al., 2004; Pattanayak, 2004; Tomich et al., 2004; Costa, 
2005; Scott et al.,2005). However, there are interesting examples of community-
based hydrological and water quality assessments (Deutsch et al., 2005), which 
might be replicated for reducing the operational costs of evaluating the effects of 
PES schemes on the condition of water resources.  
 
The hydrological evidence summarized above suggest that there might be trade-
offs in relation to the ability of PES to achieve different kinds of environmental 
goals, such as improvements of water quality, water availability and biodiversity 
protection. Equally, PES schemes may also face a trade-off between meeting 
environmental goals in the most cost-effective way and contributing to poverty 
alleviation (Kerr, 2002). Indeed, in the cases we have analyzed, the effects on 
upstream income are in general negligible, or the PES payments go to wealthy 
providers (Heredia), or they are made by users who are poor. These trade-offs 
shed some doubts on PES schemes as win-win and multipurpose instruments. 
Nonetheless, some of the information gathered supports the view that this type of 
markets may contribute to solve social conflicts. Indeed, in Jesus de Otoro, the 
PES scheme worked out as a tool for lessening conflicts between downstream and 
upstream stakeholders. This case suggests that PES schemes may aid to create 
institutional settings for easing downstream-upstream cooperation and promoting 
conflict resolution. In Jesus de Otoro, social asymmetries were not large to start 
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with. In other cases, PES schemes may seem to announce permanent land rights 
changes, and therefore perhaps they will face resistance by some social actors. 
 
We have also found that preliminary technical studies did not noticeably influence 
the design of the selected PES. Design decisions and the functioning of PES 
schemes were to a large extent the result of a complex social process, involving 
interactions between different stakeholders, rather than the outcome of a technical 
assessment. Our results also suggest that in general the calculation of upstream 
opportunity cost of forest cover based on on-farm profits overestimates actual 
willingness to accept compensation among providers. Equally, calculations of 
downstream willingness to pay probably overestimate politically and socially 
feasible fees. In our cases, the users´ payments were significantly below the 
estimated willingness to pay. Our impression is that economic valuations were 
more lip service than a real input to the decision making process. The payments 
from downstream users to upstream providers were the result of a long and 
complex negotiation process, in which local institutions and leadership played 
significant roles. When market transactions between downstream and upstream 
stakeholders are feasible, paying attention to social relations, perceptions, 
bargaining power, property rights and institutional aspects are probably more 
useful inputs to PES design than mere economic valuations.  The social 
embeddedness of markets for environmental services and the social 
transformations triggered by them, are very relevant topics for future research.  
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Table 1. Amounts paid to providers  (US $/ha/year) 
Jesus de Otoro    
Forest conservation Primary forest Secondary forest  Young forest 
 5.5 4.1 2.8 
    
Environmental  practices 2 practices adopted 3 practices 4 practices  
Short cycle crop 5.5 8.3 11 
Permanent crop 8.3 11 13.8 
Agroforestry 11 13.8 16.6 
    








third to fifth year
 51 124 100 67 
    
San Pedro del Norte    
 Forest conservation   









Table 2. Providers 
 






(in a year) 
to gross 
income 
PES/area Net on-farm 
 profits  




 US$/year % US$/ha/year US$/ha/year US$/ha/year US$/ha/year  
1 7,625 0.4 15.9  15.6  Wood 
2 5,374 1.2 11.9  55.6  Soil protection 
3 12,059 0.6 9.5  19.4  Climate 
regulation  
Average 8,353  12.4  30.2   
San Pedro del Norte 
1 4,562 0.03 26.4 106 89 133 Wood 
2 3,005 0.02 18.7 423 266 531 Water 
3 360 0.15 26.6 -39 133 n.a. Wood 
4 863 0.08 26.6 -65 89 354 Climate 
regulation 
5 1,329 0.03 33.1 206 156 319 Water 
Average 2,024  26.3 126 147 334  
Heredia 
1 60,000 0.7 43.0  227 200 Scenery 
2 90.377 0.5 21.4  50 400 Climate 
regulation 
3 13,800 1.6 55.7  600 1,500 Water 
4 171,573 1.2 55.6  100 650 Biodiversity 
5 19,091 9.5 51.9  114 455 Scenery 
6 13,398 6.6 52.1  80 n.a. Leisure 
7 33,679 1.3 30.3  30 120 Water 
8 4,522 6.9 52.3  68 105 Scenery 
9 132,000 0.1 49.0  100 300 Scenery 
10 52,110 21.8 42.2  n.a. 200 Scenery 

















 US$/year US$/ha/year US$/ha/year 
Jesus de Otoro    
1 1,353 262 79.4 
2 3,157 603 23.8 
3 2,957 1079 79.4 
4 2,267 -78 12.7 
5 1,165 231 44.1 
6 836 384 14.7 
7 1,252 -189 111.1 
8 2,822 192 27.6 
9 3,588 287 33.9 
Average 2,155 308 47.4 
San Pedro    
1 1,223 76 53 
2 2,321 297 62 
3 1,485 -9 62 
4 301 206 266 
Average 1,333 142.5 111 








Table 4. Degree of compensation  
(PES- Opportunity cost). Average. US$/ha/year 
 
 Method 1    
(on-farm profits) 
Method 2  
 (fair price) 
Method 3 
(willingness to rent) 
Jesus de Otoro    
Providersa  -19  
Potential Providersb -302  -42 
San Pedro    
Providers -100 -120 -308 
Potential Providers -116  -84 
Heredia    
Providers  -107 -421 
    
 
a Opportunity cost of better environmental practices 
b Opportunity cost of forest conservation (assuming a PES equal to 5.52 US$/ha/year) 
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Table 5. Socioeconomic background and 
perceptions of users 
 
 Jesus de Otoro San Pedro Heredia 
N of the survey 100 56 100 
Average income, US$/month (s.d.) 245  66  952  
Payment to the PES scheme, US$/household/month (* US$/m3)  0.06  0.31 0.008*  
Education (%)    
Incomplete primary school 29  45 20  
Complete primary school 17  10 5  
Incomplete secondary school  25  9 24  
Complete secondary school 21  18 9 
No formal education 6  16 0  
Post-secondary (complete or incomplete) 2  2 41  
Water consumption (%)    
Drink water directly form the tap 57  98 86  
Boil water 16  0 5  
Buy potable water 9  2 9  
Filter water 7  0 0  
Other purification methods 10  0 0  
Perception on the relationship between forest cover and water (%)    
More forest leads to better water quality 85  91 97  
More forest leads to more water quantity 93  100 98  
Lack of relationship between forest cover and water quality 7  7 3 
Lack of relationship between forest cover and water quantity 6  0 2 
Negative relationship between forest cover and water quality 6  2 0 
Negative relationship between forest cover and water quantity 0  0 0 
Main benefits from forests (%)    
Water provision 57  54 68  
Climate regulation 17  16 22  
Watershed protection 8  2 0  
Wood and firewood 10  21 2  
Non-timber forest products 3  2 0  
Beauty and biodiversity 0  0 8  
Don’t know 4  5 0  
Perception on PES and water service (%)    
Awareness of the scheme 43  32 21  
Agree with the amount of the payment 72  29 92 
Water availability has improved during the last two years 64 59 39 
Water quality has improved during the last two years 79 55 39 
Water availability has not changed during the last two years 0 41 61 
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Water quality has not changed during the last two years 0 45 61 
Water availability has worsened during the last two years 21 0 0 
Water quality has worsened during the last two years 21 0 0 
Overall quality of water service is good 79  11 90  
Overall quality of water service is regular  16  30 10  
Overall quality of water service is bad 5  59 0  







Table 6. Forest cover and hydrology: 
 conventional wisdom and scientific evidence  
 
Conventional wisdom Scientific evidence 
Forests increase runoff With the exception of cloud forests, 
runoff in forested areas is lower than in 
those with shorter vegetation  
Forests increase dry season flows This effect is site-specific. 
Afforestation may result in either 
increased or reduced dry season flows 
Forests reduce peakflows Once a new vegetation cover is well-
established, peakflows no longer differ 
from forested conditions. The effect is 
of decreasing importance as the size 
and the number of tributaries in the 
basin increase. Under certain 
conditions, large stormflows may also 
emerge from forested areas.  
Forests encourage more rainfall  This only holds in the case of large-
scale deforestation. Local precipitation 
is not significantly affected by forest 
cover (with the exception of cloud 
forests) 
Forests increase groundwater recharge  Groundwater recharge is affected in a 
similar way to seasonal flows 
Summary from the reviews made by Calder (2004), Ayward (2005) and 
Bruijnzeel et al.(2005). 
